Abstract--Investment in the state of art machinery, tooling, and R&D is widely seen as a prerequisite for achieving industry competitiveness in the long term. Therefore, the provision for investment-based incentives by countries is perceived as a way of supporting industry competitiveness. Despite this being a global phenomenon, there is no formal process to guide the offer of industry incentives. The process of designing such incentives is often based on intuition rather than on formal models, making it difficult to assess such industry interventions objectively and to improve on them. Specific to South Africa, the offer of incentives to the automotive industry to support its competitiveness has had mixed results. In particular, investment in R&D has remained minimal. The paper presents a system dynamics model as a proposed instrument in formalising the offer of incentives, applied to the South African government's offer of incentives to the automotive manufacturing sector. The model was developed from qualitative and quantitative information on how the incentive dispensation had been structured. Simulations with the incentive model reveal that the incentive dispensation, as a stand-alone intervention, has had a significant and positive effect on industry investment, but has had no specific policy lever to direct investment into R&D and consequent innovative activities. By this measure, the model has not been a strong policy instrument for supporting long-term industry competitiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Like many developing countries, South Africa's adoption of an outward-looking industrial development policy strategy after its 1994 democratic transition was motivated, in part, by the desire to detach domestic industry performance from national economic growth [2] . It was acknowledged that the domestic market was not able to support sufficiently high production volumes that could allow efficient and competitive domestic production. Given the emphasis put on exports and foreign investment to drive national growth, international competitiveness became an important component of overall national development strategy. South African policy makers hoped to emulate the successful interventions of some East Asian governments that had achieved high economic growth rates through exporting [4] . In 1995, the South African government launched a Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) aimed at establishing a competitive industry, both locally and globally. Under the programme, government provided industry with import duty rebates based on local content exported and with a duty free allowance. The MIDP replaced a series of protection measures and local content requirements that had previously characterised the industry [2] . The main objectives of the MIDP were to increase competitiveness of the industry, encourage industry growth through export, stabilise employment levels, improve the industry's trade balance and make vehicles more affordable in the domestic market [1] . In 2000, government introduced an investment incentive for the industry, the Productive Asset Allowance (PAA). The PAA was intended to support efforts to make the domestic industry competitive in the long term, including capitalised R&D expenditure. Despite offer of substantial industry incentives to its automotive industry, industry performance under the MIDP dispensation reveals that investment in R&D remained minimal. For a period 1995-2004, during which the MIDP incentives were in effect, R&D investment as a proportion of total industry investment was less than 10% on average (Table 1 ). Yet investment R&D and innovation activities have a strong bearing on domestic technology progress and sustainable competitiveness in the modern era [6] , [9] , [10] , [17] , [20] . The low level of R&D in the automotive industry seems, however, to be in line with findings of the South African Innovation survey of 2001. The survey found that R&D expenditure as percentage of sales in the manufacturing of machinery and equipment to be 0.8% [14] . The ineffectiveness of South Africa's automotive incentive dispensation to direct investment in R&D and consequent innovative activities necessitated a revisit of the industry incentive model. However, for this to be done rigorously, a formal model had to exist. Like many policies in developing countries, the MIDP policy framework was based on intuition and consensus among stakeholders. Its assumptions remained embedded in the mental models of its historical promoters, making it hard to discern internal inconsistencies. The problem with such intuitive models is that they cannot be assessed scientifically to allow objective analysis and improvement. In order to investigate how a change in policy rules would affect industry performance dynamics regarding the competitive objective, a system dynamics model of the industry incentives was developed. Formalising of intuitive mental models makes model assumptions explicit, has a potential to expose model conception flaws and can reveal the effectiveness of policy levers in the model structure. Hence, model formalisation enhances models' quality and increases the reliability of their simulations, an aspect critically important for improvement of policy intervention [16] . The model provided a formal means to test how policy decisions on the MIDP incentive model would affect industry competitiveness in the long term.
II. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
In the formalisation of the competitiveness incentives for South Africa's automotive manufacturing industry, a system dynamics (SD) approach was used. The use of the approach was motivated, in part, by complexity of industry performance dynamics and the need to account for feedback effects of any industry intervention. System dynamics as a methodology is grounded in control theory and theory of nonlinear dynamics. The approach provides a means by which to capture complex relationships and feedback effects within a set of interrelated activities and processes that often characterise policy models [19] . Its presentation has a userfriendly interface that encourages non-academics to internalise the logic behind the model. In addition, the approach allows the use of quantitative and qualitative data; hence, it is not limited in its use when quantitative data is unavailable.
Specialised software in system dynamics modelling allows scenario simulations, in fairly easy and understandable steps, an aspect that is important in applied research. For this project Stella software version 9.0.2 was used.
Quantitative industry performance data for estimation of model parameters and rates of change was collected from the Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa and the National Association of Automotive Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA) publications and related communications.
One of the biggest challenges in the formalising of a policy dispensation is access to relevant qualitative data that captures the thinking behind a dispensation. Developing the incentive model required specific understanding of the intentions of the model promoters and the assumptions underlying the dispensation. Such data was not explicit in the numerical and written data sources. It is widely acknowledged by a number of leading authors on system dynamics modelling that the most important data required to build a system dynamics model is often qualitative [11] . Specific to policy work, subsequent formulation of a dynamic hypothesis and formulation of a qualitative model requires insight into the mental models of role players [11] , [18] . Key variables underlying behaviour of interest resides in the mental database of some of the actors [15] . Sterman [18] contend that more often, mental data cannot be accessed directly but must be elicited through interviews, observation and other methods. In order to access qualitative data, the researcher usually needs to interact with people involved in the study situation over and above the use of archival research, data collection, interviews and direct observation or participation [18] . The research had to include means to tap into information in stakeholders' minds. Hence qualitative data to support the model building process was collected using two techniques: participant observation, under which the researcher attended policy review meetings for a period 18 months, and discourse analysis. In the following section, the development of the model is explained via a stepwise increase in scope.
III. THE PAA-IEC MODEL STRUCTURE
The model was constructed sequentially for two main incentives for automotive manufacturing, the Production Asset Allowance (PAA) and the Import Export Complementation (IEC) scheme. The PAA incentive dispensation allows receipt of import duty rebates based on investment, while the IEC allows receipt of duty offsets based on the value of exported local content.
IV. THE PAA
Under the PAA dispensation, only investment in new and unused productive assets qualifies for benefit [7] . The value of assets qualifying for the PAA is therefore a proportion of total industry investment that can be captured by the equation:
where P AA I t is the PAA qualifying investment in the year t, α is the PAA qualifying investment fraction and I t is total annual industry investment.
Benefit from the qualifying investment takes the form of import duty rebates and is set at 20% of the qualifying investment. The value of rebates that can be generated from a particular value of qualifying investment can be presented as:
. 0 (2) where P AA RG is the PAA rebates generated per annum and the 0.2 is the existing PAA benefit fraction.
Since the benefit from the PAA is spread over a five-year period, the value of annual rebate certificates that can be generated is according to the equation:
where RCR represents the value of rebate certificate release per year and the 5 represents the five-year period over which the PAA benefit is spread.
The value of imports that can be brought into the country using PAA rebates depends on the prevailing import duty rate and the value of rebates issued in a particular year according to the equation:
where P AA RI t is the value of imports that can be brought into the country, using the PAA rebates and IMPORTDUTY is the prevailing import duty rate in the year under consideration.
Next, the feedback effect of PAA rebates was incorporated. The first step was to make industry investment endogenous. This was done by introducing the investment rate variable. Industry investment per year was set to depend on annual investment rate i.e.
( )
where I rate is the annual investment growth rate.
Equation 5 depicts, implicitly, a potential exponential increase in industry investment over time. This baseline growth rate assumption was used at this stage. It is possible, however, to introduce more complex growth rate predictions.
One of the most import aspects of system dynamics modelling and a source of insights into system performance is the identification of feedback effects. These constitute closed loops, where the level of outcomes has an effect on the level of inputs. In the PAA incentive model, two investmentdetermining factors were identified and introduced -domestic market and exports.
Investment depends on planned production and planned production is, to a large extent, a function of projected domestic market size and exports levels. It is widely acknowledged that local market size is a major factor in investment location decisions particularly in the automotive industry. Jenkins & Thomas [8] mentions that the size of the local market is believed to the most important motivation for European subsidiary companies in Southern Africa. European subsidiary companies happen to be strongly represented in South Africa's automotive industry. Exports augment the domestic market size while imports, whether rebated or otherwise, reduce the effective domestic market.
PAA rebatable imports add to the stock of industry imports into the country on which the industry did not pay duties. Given that the only way industry could benefit from the PAA incentive was through importing and offsetting duties payable using earned rebate certificates, firms would tend to import until they have exhausted import rebates received.
To account for the effects of domestic market size, exports and PAA rebatable imports on investment, the normal-investment-growth fraction variable was introduced. At this stage of model construction, both domestic industry and exports were taken to be static. To the extent that the above three variables affect investment, actual investment growth fraction would differ from the normal growth fraction. The difference would be the effect emanating from production potential factor (the basis of domestic production plans), which was postulated to be proportional to: (domestic market + exports -PAA rebatable imports)/ (domestic market + exports). The logic of the equation was that as long as there are no rebatable imports, investment would grow at a normal rate dictated by the size of the domestic market and export potential.
The effect of PAA rebatable imports on production potential factor, which in turn affected the actual investment growth fraction, constituted a closed loop of the PAA incentive model (Figure 1 As indicated previously, the IEC scheme also contributes to rebatable imports. Therefore, the effect of rebatable imports on production plans was underestimated in the PAA model above, as it did not take into account additional rebatable imports generated through the import-export complementation dispensation. In the following section, the model is extended to include the import-export complementation dispensation, which contributed also to the value of rebatable imports in the industry.
V. IMPORT-EXPORT COMPLEMENTATION MODEL STRUCTURE
Under the import-export complementation dispensation, firms earn Import Rebate Credit Certificates (IRCCs), based on a proportion of exported local content. Exports were specified as being determined by export growth rate, which rate was assumed exogenously determined -OEM exports are largely dependent on parent decisions but may be influenced by incentive offer.
As such, the equation for industry exports per year could be presented as:
where E t is total industry exports per annum in the year t, and ß is the export growth rate fraction.
The exported value of local content is captured by the equation:
where ELC is the exported value of local content and ELCF is the exported local content fraction.
In terms of calculating the IRCC value to be awarded to an exporting entity, the exported value of local content was discounted at a rate determined by Government. The IRCC value generated, therefore, was a function of exported local content and the exported local content beneficiation fraction as determined for a particular year. Equation (8) 
where IRCCVALUE is the value of IRCCs generated per year, and LCBF the export local content beneficiation fraction.
By definition, the value of rebatable imports, under the IEC dispensation, is equivalent to the value of IRCCs issued and is independent of the import duty rate.
Given this further adjustment, IRCCs generated under the IEC dispensation added to the overall stock of industry rebatable imports. To estimate the overall effect of rebatable imports on production plans, the PAA model and the IEC model were combined. A new variable, namely industry rebatable imports, which was a summation of PAA rebatable imports and IRCC rebatable imports was introduced. The direct link between PAA rebatable imports and production plans was removed and instead a link between PAA rebatable imports and industry rebatable imports on one hand, and IRCCs rebatable imports and industry rebatable imports on the other, was created. Thereafter, industry rebatable imports were linked to production potential factor. An important aspect to take note of under the combined PAA-IEC model was the fact that exports and the domestic market were allowed to vary over time through introduction of the respective projected growth rates.
For completeness of structure, the PAA-IEC model was extended to include the industry trade balance variable. Introducing the trade balance variable allows sensitivity analysis of the industry trade balance account in response to a policy decision on the PAA and IEC incentive dispensations of the MIDP.
Industry imports were specified as an endogenous variable that depended on the import decision. The domestic market and the value of rebatable imports at industry level influenced the import decision. Before a firm within the industry could import, it had to have some insight into how much imports the domestic market could absorb. After establishing the import absorption capacity of the domestic market, the firm would have to consider the almost mandatory import it has to undertake in order to make use of import rebates earned. Hence it was postulated that the domestic market and rebatable imports were determining factors of the import decision. If there was no commensurate increase in the domestic market, there was a high likelihood that as rebatable imports increased, industry imports would also increase.
In the quantification of the model and behind the import decision, the impact of domestic market and rebatable imports on imports growth fraction was specified as being dependent on the ratio of industry rebatable imports and the domestic market. This impact declined as the value of rebatable imports tended toward the domestic market size. Figure 2 presents the extended PAA-IEC-Trade Balance model structure. The PAA-IEC-Trade Balance model in Figure 2 could be quantified and used to simulate effects of the PAA and IEC policy variables on industry investment. For full modelling of trade balance the effect of the duty free allowance has to be added in a manner similar to the above process. 
VI. MODEL VALIDATION AND TESTING
Despite the wide use of the word 'validation' in modelling literature, models cannot be validated -if validation is taken to mean establishing truthfulness of the model. This is so because all models are simplified representations of reality developed with a mindset biased towards what the model intends to do and for whom it is intended to serve. What can be validated, however, are the analytical statements and propositions derived from the axioms of closed logical systems [18] . The issue is not about the validity of the model but its usefulness. When system dynamists talk about model validation, they are usually referring to ways to make the model useful and acceptable to the intended clientele, a process that is more subjective than scientific. Referring to model validation Forrester [5] wrote:
Objective model-validation procedure rests eventually at some lower level of judgement or faith that either the procedure or its goals are acceptable without objective proof.
One way in which to validate the model was to establish if it could, to a reasonable extent, replicate reference mode behaviour of interest; in this case it was industry vehicle manufacturers' (also referred to Original Equipment Manufacturers -OEMs) investment. Although it is widely acknowledged that the objective of system dynamics modelling is not point prediction of a system performance but rather to probe dynamics underlying a particular behaviour, it is important that an SD model can endogenously reproduce the reference mode of interest. Without replication of the reference mode, the model becomes irrelevant in providing insight into the problematic situation and as such cannot be useful. Richardson and Pugh [15] state that if a model cannot reproduce its reference behaviour mode, it is invalid. The simulation base run showed that the model could endogenously replicate the smoothed reference mode behaviour (Figure 3) . Replication of the reference behaviour from an endogenous perspective indicated that the model could be useful in indicating leverage variables or points of action that could influence the industry investment trend. The complete set of Stella model equations for the base run reproducing the reference mode trend are presented in Appendix 1.
VII. POLICY RULE CHANGES AND IMPLICATIONS TO INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS
Under the PAA dispensation, there are only two policy variables under the control of government -the PAA benefit fraction and the import duty. As such, policy decisions on the PAA relate fundamentally to adjusting the PAA benefit fraction and/or industry import duties. Model simulation of vehicle manufacturers' investment reveals that a change in the PAA benefit fraction has minimal influence on the investment trend. Figure 4 shows investment trend with the PAA benefit set at 0.2, 0.5 and 1.0 respectively. The insensitivity of investment to PAA benefit fractions points to the fact that investment in the country is more likely a function of domestic economic fundamentals, rather than incentives as a particular lever. On the other hand, a change in import duties did have a noticeable effect on OEM investment in the medium term. The model simulation showed that in 2012, investment level by OEMs would be a billion rand less if import duties were to be reduced from the 30% to 5% ( Figure 5 ). The inverse relationship between import duty rate and domestic investment suggests that size of the domestic market is an important determinant of domestic investment. Lowering of import duties encourages vehicle imports which in turn replaces local supply to the domestic market, reducing local production potential, consequently leading to less planned investment. The reduction in domestic investment because of lowering import duty also implicitly indicates that the domestic industry is not competitive relative to other locations producing the comparable vehicles. Otherwise, imports would not increase, with a reduction in import duties, to the extent of causing an adjustment to investment if the location was competitive. Significant effect on investment occurred with a concurrent increase in PAA benefit fraction and reduction in ELCBF (Figure 7 ). According to model simulations, by reducing ELCBF from 0.9 to 0.1 and increasing the PAA benefit fraction from 0.2 to 0.9, the difference in projected investment would increase by more than 3 billion in the year 2012. Again, the biggest impact on investment emanates from the ELCBF. Of course the simulation is based on 'ceteris paribus' assumption but fundamentally it is indicative of the PAA benefit fraction and ELCBF as being effective policy levers, in combination, in influencing industry investment. Most important to note is than none of the policy decisions on the MIDP incentive model as captured in Figure  4 to Figure 7 has a direct effect on the nature of investment. As such, it is likely that the automotive industry investment composition as witnessed in the first 10 years of MIDP incentives would remain in the foreseeable future.
Although there were other generic incentives for R&D offered by the Department of Trade and Industry South Africa, to the extent that MIDP incentives were positioned to support competitiveness, they had to have some effect on R&D and innovation activities in the automotive industry. The MIDP incentive dispensation model did not include investment in R&D or innovative activities as one of its endogenous variables. Investment in productive assets and in R&D was taken as equivalent, and the expectation was that industry would invest proportionally in R&D as per international levels. But this did not happen. One way through which R&D investment could have been introduced in the model, as an endogenous variable, would have been to make it a qualifying criterion for the PAA. On the whole, the weakness of the MIDP incentive dispensation to support industry longer term competitiveness emanated, largely, from the model conceptualisation.
VIII. INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSION
South Africa being located at the southern end of the African continent has a location disadvantage in terms of transport cost to and from major international vehicle markets. Given the oligopolisitic nature of the global automotive industry coupled with global oversupply of vehicles, countries need to provide OEMs with extra motivation to invest in manufacturing in a particular country. Through the offer of a package of incentives under the MIDP, investment growth in the domestic automotive industry in South Africa was attained. Moreover, model simulations show that government could influence industry investment through adjusting MIDP policy rules. However, the MIDP incentive model has no explicit policy levers to influence industry investment composition -investment in R&D and resulting innovative activities vis-à-vis investment in machinery, tooling and equipment. To the extent that investment in R&D and consequent innovative activities is a pre-requisite for long term industry competitiveness, the MIDP incentive dispensation is a weak policy framework for supporting longterm industry competitiveness. South Africa's automotive incentive model demonstrates one of the limitations of selective industry intervention to support competitiveness among late developing countries. Many developing countries appreciate the need to become competitive and put in place various forms of incentives to motivate industry efforts towards such activities. However, some supportive policy frameworks lack inbuilt and practical policy levers to channel investment in activities that do ultimately put local industries on sustained competitiveness path. Ensuring that a particular policy dispensation does indeed support industry competitiveness often requires formal modelling of the dispensation and identifying policy levers within the model that can influence industry to make competitiveness-oriented decisions. Otherwise, well intended industry-competitiveness interventions may end up not achieving the intended long term competitiveness.
